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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Barber asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
district court's finding on the domestic battery felony enhancement that elevated his 
domestic battery conviction to a felony because the evidence did not establish that his 
two prior convictions were separate and distinct from one another. In the alternative, he 
asserts that the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial on the 
felony enhancement when it found the enhancement in the absence of a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Mr. Barber's mid-trial stipulation 
that he had two prior domestic violence convictions waived any sufficiency claim, and 
that, even if it did not, the plain language of the enhancement statute does not require 
proof of two separate and distinct prior convictions. With respect to the jury trial claim, 
the State argues that Mr. Barber's mid-trial stipulation amounted to a waiver of his right 
to a jury trial, and justified the district court's decision to dismiss the jury and issue its 
own verdict. 
This Reply Brief is necessary in order to respond to the State's arguments 
concerning the jury trial issue and whether the enhancement statute requires proof of 
two separate and distinct prior convictions. With respect to any remaining arguments, 
Mr. Barber will rely on the arguments set forth in his Appellant's Brief. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Barber's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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ISSUES 
1. Does the domestic battery felony enhancement statute require proof of two 
separate and distinct prior convictions? 
2. Did Mr. Barber's mid-trial stipulation to two prior convictions amount to a waiver 
of his right to a jury trial on the felony enhancement and justify discharging the 
jury? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Domestic Battery Felony Enhancement Statute Requires Proof Of Two Separate 
And Distinct Prior Convictions 
In arguing against Mr. Barber's claim that, in order for a domestic battery 
conviction to be elevated to a felony, the two prior convictions relied upon must be 
separate and distinct, the State argues that "nothing in the plain language of the felony 
domestic violence enhancement, I.C. § 18-918(3)(c), reflects such a legislative intent 
nor is the state aware of any case construing the felony domestic violence statute in this 
manner." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) 
The problems with the State's argument are two-fold. First, the plain language of 
the enhancement statute contemplates increasing degrees of culpability based on 
separate and distinct incidents. This can be seen from the two sentences that precede 
the sentence providing for a felony enhancement, which provide: 
A first conviction under this subsection (3) is punishable by a fine not 
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in a county 
jail not to exceed six (6) months, or both. Any person who pleads guilty to 
or is found guilty of a violation of this subsection (3) who previously has 
pied guilty to or been found guilty of a violation of this subsection (3), or of 
any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, notwithstanding the 
form of the judgment or withheld judgment, within ten (10) years of the first 
conviction, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed one (1) year or by 
a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000) or by both fine and 
imprisonment .... 
I.C. § 18-918(3)(c). 
The second problem with the State's argument is that it ignores the fact that 
when the legislature adopted I.C. § 18-918(3)(c) in 1993, State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341 
(Ct. App. 1986), the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion interpreting the persistent violator 
4 
statute, had been the law of the land in Idaho for seven years. It is a well-established 
principle of Idaho law that "[s]tatutes are construed under the assumption that the 
legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal precedence [sic] at the time the 
statute was passed." Druffel v. Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 856 (2002) (citations 
omitted); see also George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540 (1990) 
("It is assumed that when the legislature enacts or amends a statute it has full 
knowledge of the existing judicial decisions and case law of the state.") (citations 
omitted). 
In an analogous situation, the legislature has responded to existing case law 
interpreting certain statutes providing for mandatory minimum sentences as not 
requiring execution of such sentences when adopting a subsequent mandatory 
minimum sentence statute to clarify that such sentences must be executed and may not 
be suspended. See State v. Patterson, 148 Idaho 166, 169-70 (Ct. App. 2009) 
("Through the language of I.C. § 37-2739B(b), the legislature acknowledged the 
semantic distinction drawn by this Court in Haggard, and later re-affirmed in Hayes, 
when it provided that the fixed minimum sentence shall be for a term 'of confinement."'). 
Given the fact that the plain text of the statute provides for a conviction-by-
conviction escalation of the penalties for repeat offenses, along with the presumption 
that the legislature was aware of the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in Brandt when it 
enacted the statute, and, had it intended to have the statute apply differently than the 
persistent violator statute, the legislature could have made its wishes clear (as it had 
done with I.C. § 37-2739B(b)), Mr. Barber's reading of the statute is the correct one. 
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11. 
Mr. Barber's Mid-Trial Stipulation To Two Prior Convictions Did Not Amount To A 
Waiver Of His Right To A Jury Trial And Did Not Justify Discharging The Jury 
In opposing Mr. Barber's argument that the district court's action in dismissing 
the jury mid-trial and entering a verdict against him, based on his stipulation to having 
two prior convictions, violated his constitutional right to a jury trial on the enhancement 
finding, the State argues "Barber has failed to meet his burden of establishing his 
stipulation and related wavier of his right to a jury trial was invalid." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.13 (footnote omitted).) The problem with the State's argument is that it assumes that, 
by stipulating to having two prior convictions in the middle of a jury trial, Mr. Barber 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily intended to waive his right to have the jury 
decide whether he was subject to the enhancement. No mention was made of the 
effect that the stipulation would have on the jury trial being conducted at the time of the 
stipulation; therefore, the stipulation cannot be said to have amounted to a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial on the enhancement finding. 
Adopting the State's reasoning would justify dismissing a jury prior to its verdict if, while 
testifying at trial, a criminal defendant acknowledged his guilt. For this reason, along 
with those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Barber asserts that the district court 
violated his constitutional right to a jury trial on the enhancement finding when it 
discharged the jury mid-trial and entered a verdict against him. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Barber 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction for felony 
domestic battery, and remand this matter for sentencing on the conviction for 
misdemeanor domestic battery. In the alternative, if this Court finds the evidence 
sufficient to sustain the district court's finding as to the enhancement, or declines to 
reach that issue, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the enhancement 
finding, and remand this matter for a jury trial on the enhancement. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2013. 
SPE~C!£R J. HAHN 
DeputyState Appellate Public Defender 
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